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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County issued by the Honorable Judge Lee A. Dever. Ali
Ghaffarian 11 n 11 1 i ill, Nasri Faezi individually, and Ali Ghaffarian and Nasri
Faezi dba Access Auto, the Defendants/Appellants, appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). The Utah
Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
moved this appeal over to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether there is evidence to support the district court s finding that
plaintiff and defendant were partners in Access Auto.

Standard of Review: Whether a partnership exists is "ordinarily a question of
fact." Rogers v. Bitner, 738 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987). To challenge factual
findings, the appellant must show that the findings are clearly erroneous when
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-6 (Utah 1994).
II.

Whether Plaintiff, Hassan Mardanlou's, claims were barred by any
statute of limitations.

Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, |32, 44
P.3d 742. "However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the
1

discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination-the point at
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal
injury. This is a question of fact." Id.
III.

Whether the district court correctly awarded rental value and
prejudgment interest as damages.

Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny ... interest is a
question of law which we review for correctness." Cheves v. Williams, 1999
UT 861(41, 993 P.2d 191.
IV.

Whether the district court erred in its determination that Defendants
were entitled to a set off for the increased value of the property due to
improvements made after November 4, 1997 instead of a set off for onehalf the actual cost of said improvements.

Standard of Review: Challenge of a conclusion of law is not accorded any
deference, but is reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Resolution of this case necessarily involves application of the following
Utah Code provisions:
48-1

Rights i

continued.
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under any of the
conditions set forth in Section 48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or Section 8 I
35(2)(b) without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the
person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his
legal representatives as against such persons or partnership may have th

;

)f

his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary
creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership
with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representatives, ir

of

interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the
dissolved partnership; provided, that the creditors of the dissolved partnership as
against the separate creditors or the representative of the retired or deceased
partner shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided by
Section 48-1-38(8).
78-12-6. Actions
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an action, founded upon
the title to real property or to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual,
illi less it appears that the person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense
3

or counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or
counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was
seized or possessed of the property in question within seven years before the
committing of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or defense or
counterclaim made.
78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any
article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is received.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to
state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause
of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or
describing such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently
clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so
barred.
4

Utah Rules of Civil Pro'
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
•;

oppoi I: i in it} of tt i = ti ial c JI n I; to ji icige the credibility of the witnesses.
.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of a business relationship between the
Plaintiff/Appellee, Hassan "Sam" Mardanlou and Defendant/Apellant Ali
Ghaffarian. Appeal was taken after a two-day bench trial on the issue of whether
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a partnership agreement regarding the
property purchased

° P e r a t e a used car business under the name

"Access Auto." (R-1221-24). This case was first tried in part before Judge
Henriod on July 13, 2000. After the first day of trial, the parties entered into a
settlement in open coin I: , 1 ipoi i \ - 1 li ::! I judgment was entered on August 15, 2000
(R-1288 at pp. 196-98). Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside Settlement on
August 14, 2000. (R-182-187). After Judge Henriod recused himself, an
evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Dever on March 2f

-< =

1289).

Judge Dever granted the motion and entered an order setting aside the judgment
on April 13, 2001, finding that the Defendant's settlement was not the product of a
knowing, voluntai ] ai id intelligent conclusion." (R-383).
The case was then tried before Judge Dever on October 15, 16, and 17,
2002. (R-1290-92). On October 18, 2002, Judge Dever announced his findings
and conclusions from the 1eiicI

I R-1292 at pp. 517-519). Judge Dever made the
5

following factual findings: 1) The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a
lease/purchase agreement which established that the agreement was a partnership
or joint venture agreement; 2) Insurance documents named both parties together;
3) Business cards printed in Access Auto's name had both party's names on them;
4) The insurance agent testified that he was led to believe the parties were
partners; 5) Hashem Farr testified that Defendant told him that he and Plaintiff
were partners; 6) There was a division of labor; 7) The parties both contributed
money and property to the business and the Plaintiff generally acted as a person
who believed himself to be in a partnership. (Id.)
Based on these findings, Judge Dever ruled that Mr. Mardanlou was a
partner in Access Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian, and that Mr. Ghaffarian had
appropriated partnership property by purchasing the property that was the subject
of the lease agreement solely in his own name in November 1993. Judge Dever
ordered the Ghaffarians to deed one-half of the property to Mr. Mardanlou,
effective on the date of the dissolution of the partnership, November 1997, and
subject to further hearing to apportion the debt incurred in connection with the
Property. (R 931-936).
An evidentiary hearing was held by the district court on April 3, 2003,
pursuant to Defendants' Motion for Limited New Trial. (R-1293 at pp. 15-111).
On July 22, 2003, the district court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and
)

Conclusions of Law and a Memorandum Decision and Order (R-1078), after
which the defendants filed a Motion to Amend and Objections on August 13,
6

2003. (R-1110). The district court granted this motion in part and denied it in part
by its Order dated April 20, 2004 (R-1197).
The district court entered its final Amended Judgment on September 17,
2004, in which it ordered the Defendants to transfer by deed to plaintiff an
undivided half interest in the real property "known as Access Auto." (R-1221-23).
The interest to be transferred to Plaintiff Mardanlou "subject to an equitable lien in
favor of Defendants, reflecting the obligation of Plaintiff to pay Defendants onehalf the $663,414.90 amount that Defendant advanced towards the Property" after
November 7, 1997 through June 14, 2004, for mortgage payments, insurance,
property taxes, improvements and interest. (Id.) The court also found that the
Defendant's interest in the property was subject to an equitable lien in favor of Mr.
Mardanlou, in the amount of one half the Court-determined $83,500 annual rental
value from November 7, 1997 until the date of judgment, plus interest. The court
dismissed all remaining claims with prejudice. (Id.)
The Ghaffarians filed their Notice of Appeal on October 13, 2004. 9R1225). Mr. Mardanlou filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on October 25, 2004. (R1246).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of a business relationship between the
Plaintiff/Appellee, Hassan "Sam" Mardanlou and Defendant/Appellant Ali
Ghaffarian. In November 1991 Hassan Mardanlou, and Ali Ghaffarian, entered
into a partnership to operate a used car lot at 3960-64 South State Street, Salt Lake
7

City, Utah (R-1290 at p. 38:14-16; R-1290 at p. 55:7-11; R-1291 at p. 320:6-10).
As an important part of that partnership, Hassan and Ali together executed a lease,
with an option to purchase, with the landlord, Cline Dahle Investment (Plaintiffs
Trial Exh. 1) (R-1290 at p. 35:8-15; R-1291 atp. 252:11). At that same time, Ali
called William Shober, his insurance agent, to put Hassan on the insurance policy
as a partner in Access Auto (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4) (R-1290 at p. 40:20-23; R1291 at p. 271:16-19). This was necessary to transfer the business insurance to
their new location. The lease on the business property was renewed in November
of 1992 (R-1290 at p. 41:6). After leasing the property, the parties combined their
resources to begin their business together. For his part, Mr. Mardanlou
contributed $2,000 in furniture and equipment for the business. (R-1290 at p.
35:19-25). Additionally, Ali purchased Business cards for the new partners,
listing both of their names. (R-1290 at pp. 40:10-41:6; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4).
These cards were purchased and paid for by a check drawn from the M & M
checking account, which was signed by Ali. (R-1291 at pp. 37:14-20; 253:11-16).
Naturally, Hassan never purchased business cards either solely in his name or for
M & M motors as an independent entity. (R-1291 at p. 43:21-24).
In November 1993, Ali, by himself, without the knowledge or permission
of Hassan, exercised the option contained in the lease for the amount specified to
purchase the aforementioned property. This property was purchased solely in the
name of Ali Ghaffarian dba Access Auto (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 7) (R-1291 at p.
295:2). Hassan was not aware that Ali had exercised the option until late 1994 or
8

early 1995, when he saw an entry in the checkbook to First Security Bank for
approximately $6,000.00 (R-1290 at p. 64:4-8). When he questioned Ali as to
what this entry represented in the checkbook, Ali replied it was for the mortgage
on the car lot. Hassan became upset and Ali told him he had done it only in his
own name because he knew that Hassan was purchasing a new home and Ali did
not want this purchase to cause Hassan any problems because he was a partner in
this property (R-1290 at p. 64:10 - p. 65:6). He said, that Hassan was a partner in
everything including the property (R-1290 at p. 65:4-8; R-1291 at p. 323:4-14).
The business duties of the partners were divided (R-1290 at p. 38:6-11; R1290 at p. 39:16-23). Ali purchased vehicles at the numerous auctions in Utah and
the adjacent western states of California and Nevada, while Hassan managed the
lot on a day-to-day basis, from opening until closing, 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m (R1290 at p. 39:16-23; R-1291 at p. 273:22-24; R-1291 at p. 321:10-15). The lot
was open 7 days a week (R-1290 at p. 57:7-9, p. 58:23 - p. 59:1-5). Ali also
handled the books and most cash disbursements.
Hassan brought five cars to the new lot from his previous lot (R-1290 at p.
40:2). Because of the new partnership, the proceeds from the sale of these cars
were paid into the account of Access Auto (R-1290 at p. 41:24). Ali then
disbursed some proceeds to Hassan, who then deposited this money into the M &
M Motors account (R-1290 at p. 42:4). Hassan used this money from the M& M
Motors account for miscellaneous expenses for the partnership (Plaintiffs Trial
Exh. 2, Exh. 3) (R-1290 at p. 42:20-23). These expenses were primarily for car
9

repairs, both mechanical and bodywork (R-1290 at p. 42:5-23). The amount spent
from November 1991 to June 1993 for the business from the M & M account was
$31,500 (R-1290 at p. 43:1). This expense includes payment for salaries of
Access Auto employees. (R-1290 at pp. 134:14-137:17; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 14).
Because of the partnership, however, Mr. Mardanlou ceased to have need for a
separate checking account for M & M Motors, so he closed that account and wrote
checks from that point on out of the Access Auto account. (R-1291 at p. 43:1120).
Following the first complete year of business, AH issued a check to Hassan
for $10,000.00 as a portion of Hassan's share of the profits of the business (R1290 at p. 48:7-20).
Hassan's wife, Debra B. Mardanlou, is an employee of the Internal
Revenue Service (R-1291 at p. 230:9-10). Hassan and Debra B. Mardanlou file
their tax returns jointly (R-1290 at p. 47:4-5). The I.R.S. is very strict in requiring
that its employees file their tax returns in a proper and timely manner, and not file
for extensions (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 11) (R-1291 at p. 231:12-14). In April 1993,
Hassan expressed his concern that the partnership, Access Auto, was neither filing
its taxes in a timely manner nor handling the employee withholdings properly (R1290 at p. 47:10-13). In response to his concern the accountant for the business,
Dimar Hogan, suggested that everyone be listed as an employee (R-1290 at p.
47:23-25). Hassan expressed concern to Ali regarding how this would affect his
partnership status (R-1290 at p. 49:3-15). Ali told him that he need not be
10

concerned, that he could be a partner and also be listed as an employee (R-1290 at
p. 49:3-15). Ali further assured Hassan that they two were the only members of
Access Auto. (R-1290 pp. 64:18-65:3).
Hassan worked an average of 12 hours a day, 7 days a week (R-1290 at p.
39:16-23, p. 57:7-9, p. 58:23-59:1-5; R-1291 at p. 273:22-24, p. 321:10-15).
Hassan, although an extremely family oriented man, spent all this time away from
his family to help his and Ali's new business grow. Hassan took only 16 days off
work, from business inception in November 1991 until his brother Karim's
paralyzing accident in January of 1996 (R-1290 at p. 57:10 - p. 59:6).
In the summer of 1996, Hassan scheduled a one-week family vacation.
Hassan, however, had to return in five days because Ali needed Hassan to handle
the bank financing and complete the necessary paperwork for the cars. This was
because Ali had never done this before (R-1290 at p. 57:15 - p. 58:9). From the
beginning of the partnership, Ali was rarely at the business location (R-1290 at p.
59:21 - p. 60:21). At least three and sometimes four days of the week, he was on
the road at auto auctions (R-1290 at p. 59:22 - p. 60:2; R-1291 at p. 258:8-12). It
should also be noted that while Ali was the principal purchaser for the business,
Hassan also purchased vehicles in behalf of Access Auto. (R-1291 at pp. 76:2277:15).
Hashem Farr has been a close friend of Ali since 1974 (R-1291 at p.
316:23-25). On many occasions Ali told Hashem that he and Hassan were
partners in the business (R-1291 at pp. 320:6-10; 323:12-17; 326:5-7; 328:9).
11

Hashem and Ali became roommates initially in the 1970s in Eastern Utah, while
attending school (R-1291 at p. 316:13-20). Hashem was an employee of Access
Auto in 1995 (R-1291 at p. 320:15-21). It was common knowledge that Hassan
and Ali were partners in the business, as evidenced by another mutual friend,
AkbarPack. (R-1290 at p. 217:1-5).
The State Tax Commission Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division document
shows that Ali himself was not an owner but only a salesman from 1989 to June
29, 1999 (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 10; R-1291 at p. 248:19-249:2). Ali claims
however that he was an owner since 1989 (R-1291 at p. 247:22-23).
From the business inception in 1991 until he left in 1997, Hassan sold most
of the vehicles at Access Auto, yet never was paid a commission (R-1291 at p.
257:10-20). All other salesmen except Ali and Hassan were paid a commission
(R-1291 at p. 257:15-20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court found that a partnership existed between the Plaintiff,
Hassan Mardanlou, and the Defendant, Ali Ghaffarian. This factual determination
should be afforded a high level of deference on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 52(a); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); Young v. Young, 979 P.2d
338, 342 (Utah 1999). When challenging a finding of fact, appellate counsel is
required to properly marshal the evidence. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34
(Utah 1998).

12

Because Mr. Ghaffarian failed to properly marshal the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court must assume that the findings
are correct. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312. Additionally, if Mr.
Ghaffarian had properly marshaled the evidence, the clear weight of the evidence
would support the trial court's finding that a partnership indeed did exist between
Plaintiff and Defendant. Hassan Mardanlou's claims are not barred by any statute
of limitation. The appropriate statute of limitations appears to be UCA §78-12-6,
because Plaintiffs claim relates to an interest in real property and to rents and
profits out of the same. It is a seven-year statute of limitations. Even if UCA §7812-25 is applicable, and Hassan's cause of action arose on November 30, 1993, the
four-year statute of limitations would be tolled by Ali's active misrepresentations
and concealment of the facts giving rise to that cause of action. Allred v.
Chvnoweth, 990 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1993)
The district court correctly awarded rental value and prejudgment damages.
At the time of trial the only evidence given for rental value was contained in the
appraisal of the property, performed by Badi Mahmood (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 8)
(R-1291 at pp. 265:2 - 267:3). Since the district court determined that Hassan
became one-half owner of the property as of November 4, 1997, he is entitled to
one-half of the fair market rental value for said property. Therefore he should be
entitled to that amount plus the statutory prejudgment interest and post-judgment
interest subsequent to the entry of the judgment. See UCA §15-1-1, Baker v.
Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp 724 (10th Cir. 1992)
13

In allowing an offset for the Defendant in the amount of the value of
improvements allegedly made to the property, the trial court relied on the guidance
of Utah statutes and case law which the court admitted were not precisely
controlling. Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 indicates that an owner of property that had
been occupied and improved by another may "pay the appraised value of
improvements and take the property." The case at bar can be distinguished
because this involves a partnership dissolution where the partners became tenants
in common upon the dissolution of the partnership. See UCA 48-1-31. The rule
as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037
(Utah 1984), holds that where tenants in common own property, and one tenant in
common expends a certain amount of money to improve the property, the other
tenant in common is liable for the costs, not the value of improvements.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT WERE PARTNERS
As an issue of fact, this Court should uphold the district court's finding that
a partnership existed between Plaintiff, Hassan Mardanlou and Defendant Ali
Ghaffarian.
A. Because Defendant Failed to Marshal all of the Evidence
Supporting the District Court's Findings of Fact, This Court Should
Leave Those Findings Undisturbed.

14

Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that "[a]
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." The purpose of the process of marshaling the
evidence is to fulfill "the important function of reminding litigants and appellate
courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. State v. Moore, 802
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As noted above, the party challenging the
fact finding "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding" (emphasis added). This Court has previously explained this requirement
as follows:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling
the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists.
After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis in original). If a party fails to fully comply with the requirement, the
appellate court is required to assume that the findings are correct. See Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higlev, 1999 UT App 278
f37,989P.2d61.
In the case at bar Defendants/Appellants have failed to sufficiently marshal
the evidence in support of Judge Dever's ruling. In Appellant's brief, the section
15

on marshaling makes mention of the following facts that support the district court
ruling:
1. Mr. Ghaffarian and Mr. Mardanlou executed a lease agreement together
for the property that was to become Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 34:1435:11).
2. Mr. Mardanlou paid $2,000 for furniture and equipment for Access
Auto at the beginning of the partnership. (R-1290 at p. 35:19-25).
3. Mr. Mardanlou paid the salaries for two of Access Auto's employees.
(R-1290 at pp. 134:14-137:17; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 14).
4. Mr. Mardanlou contributed nearly half of the total vehicles first brought
to the Access Auto lot. (R-1290 at pp. 39:24-40:5).
5. The proceeds from the aforementioned vehicles were used to pay for
repairs and other expenses associated with Access Auto's vehicles.
(Defendant's brief states that the money was paid for vehicles sold by
both M & M Motors as well as Access Auto. The record shows,
however, that the money went exclusively for cars owned by Access
Auto). (R-1290 at pp. 42:2-43:20; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 2 and 3).
6. Mr. Ghaffarian and Mr. Mardanlou purchased insurance together in the
names of both parties and "Access Auto DBA: M & M Motors". (R1290 at pp. 40:10-41:6; Plaintiff s Trial Exh. 4).
7. The insurance agent believed that Plaintiff and Defendant Ali
Ghaffarian were partners. (R-1290 at pp. 40:4-41:13).
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8. Business Cards were purchased together with the name "Access Auto"
on the top and "Ali" and "Sam" underneath. (R-1290 at pp. 36:1437:22; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 5).
9. A mutual friend of Mr. Ghaffarian and Mr. Mardanlou testified that he
heard Mr. Ghaffarian say, "don't worry... we're partners." (R-1291 at
pp. 322:24-323:14).
10. That same friend, Hashem Farr, testified that both men told him "they
had combined the business together and they were going into business
together as partners." (R-1291 at p. 320:3-10).
11. Another mutual friend, Akbar Pack testified that Mr. Mardanlou told
him he was going to join Mr. Ghaffarian in a "partnership". (R-1290 at
p. 217:1-5).
12. Mr. Mardanlou ran the car lot while Mr. Ghaffarian purchased vehicles
atauction. (R-1291 at pp. 38:10-39:23).
13. Mr. Mardanlou sold the cars from the lot and handled the financing
paperwork. Id.
14. Mr. Mardanlou received $10,000 as his share of profits in March of
1993. (R-1291 at p. 48:7-20).
While these facts by themselves are likely sufficient to support the
contention that a partnership existed between Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian,
they are not the only facts that came forth in this case to support the court's
finding. In addition to the above-mentioned facts, the Appellant has failed to
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make mention of several other facts that support the court's finding, including
some specifically set forth in the trial court's Findings of Fact. (R-931-933).
These include:
1. The business cards purchased together by Plaintiff and Defendant were
paid for by a check drawn from the M & M checking account, but
signed by Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1291 atp. 37:14-20; 253:11-16).
2. Mr. Mardanlou never had any business cards made for M & M motors
once he partnered with Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at p. 43:21-24).
3. By the end of 1992, Mr. Mardanlou closed the M & M bank account
and wrote checks from that point on out of the Access Auto account.
(R-1291 atp. 43:11-20).
4. At the beginning of the business relationship, an insurance policy was
purchased for both Access Auto and M & M Motors. The M & M
insurance policy was paid for by Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at pp. 45:2446:10).
5. Mr. Mardanlou purchased vehicles on behalf of Access Auto. (R-1291
at pp. 76:22-77:15).
6. All of the regular salesmen were paid commission, as is standard
practice in the business. Mr. Mardanlou was not. (R-1291 p. 257:1520).
7. Ali Ghaffarian represented to Mr. Mardanlou that they two were the
only members of Access Auto. (R-1290 pp. 64:18-65:3).
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8. Ali Ghaffarian signed the "doing business as" Access Auto prior to the
association of plaintiff in only his name. (R-1291 p. 252:6-11).
9. The mortgage on the property was paid for by the proceeds from the
business, Access Auto, run by Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian. (R933)
10. Mr. Mardanlou5s wife, Debra, had use of a company car with dealer
plates. (R-1291 p. 245:18-25).
While the Defendant can accurately argue that he did attempt to marshal
evidence in his brief, it is clear that several salient points were omitted by the
Defendant. This failure on behalf of the Defendant to fully comply with the
marshaling requirement as set forth above is fatal to his challenge to the district
court's finding that a partnership existed between Ali Ghaffarian and Hassan
Mardanlou. For that reason, this court should affirm the trial court's factual
findings.
B. The District Court's Finding That a Partnership Existed Between
Plaintiff and Defendant is Supported by Substantial Evidence and
Should be Upheld.
Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant sufficiently marshaled the evidence
supporting the district court's finding, this Court should affirm the finding that a
partnership existed because there is substantial evidence to support the district
court's finding of fact that a partnership existed between Hassan Mardanlou and
Ali Ghaffarian. Whether a partnership exists is "a question of fact." Rogers v.
Bitner, 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987); See also Strand v. Crannev. 607 P.2d
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295 (Utah 1980).1 As an issue of fact, it is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. See Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338. 342. Atrial court's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence. Id. If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court's determination, a factual finding is based on sufficient evidence, the
finding is not clearly erroneous. Strand. 607 P.2d at 296 (citations omitted). This
standard is highly deferential to the trial court because the witnesses and parties
appear before the trial court and the evidence is presented there. Thus, the trial
judge is "considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to gamer from a cold record." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994).
In this case, the key issue before the court is whether a partnership exists.
The answer to this question "depends primarily upon the facts of a particular case
rather than upon adherence to specific formalities." Id. A number of cases in
Utah have discussed the elements that make up a partnership, and while it is clear
that the requirements are not exactly defined, there are certain essential elements.
In Bassett v. Baker. 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court held that
essential to the existence of a partnership is a finding that the parties "combine

1

Both Defendant and Plaintiff rely upon case law dealing with "joint ventures" as opposed to specifically
referring to a "partnership". In Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 n.3, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "Any distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is irrelevant... inasmuch as the
relations among joint adventurers are mainly governed by partnership law." See also Vern Shutte & Sons
v. Broadbent 473 P.2d 885 (Utah 1970) (observing that a joint venture is in the nature of a partnership).
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their property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge." Bassett also noted that
as a general rule there should be a community of interest in the performance of the
common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual right
to control, and a right to share in the profits. Id. at 2. The following year, in
Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme court noted
that when examining the contributions made by each party to the enterprise, "It
need not be in the form of tangible assets or capital, but, as is frequently done, one
partner may make such a contribution, and this may be balanced by the other's
performance of services and the shouldering of responsibility."
In this case, the parties 1) combined their property, money, effects skill,
labor and knowledge; and 2) shared profit and control of Access Auto. For that
reason, the district court's finding that a partnership existed between the parties
should be affirmed as it is supported by sufficient evidence.
L THE PARTIES COMBINED THEIR PROPERTY, MONEY.
EFFECTS, SKILL, LABOR AND KNOWLEDGE.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974),
held that in order for a partnership to exist, it is essential that the parties "combine
their property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge." There is evidence in
this case that all of these things were combined. The record shows that when Mr.
Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian joined together to form Access Auto, Mr.
Mardanlou contributed slightly less than one half of the automobiles that they
started out with (R-1290 at pp. 39:24-40:5), and paid $2,000 for furnishings to be
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used in the business. (R-1290 at p. 35:19-25). Additionally, it is clear from the
record that Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian divided up the labor so that Mr.
Mardanlou ran the day-to-day operations of the business and Mr. Ghaffarian was
the primary purchaser of new automobiles. (R-1291 at pp. 38:10-39:23). Thus,
the parties combined their respective skills, labor and knowledge in addition to the
property and money originally commingled. Because the relationship between the
parties amply demonstrates a fulfilling of the "essential" parts of the Baker test,
the trial court's findings are clearly based on sufficient evidence and should be
upheld.
Z THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE
PARTIES SHARED PROFIT AND CONTROL OF ACCESS
AUTO.

In Bassett the Utah Supreme Court set forth other key factors that courts
may use to determine whether or not a partnership exists. These requirements are
not "essential" under the Bassett rule, but the Court in that case did point out that
"As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the performance of
the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual
right to control, a right to share in the profits and ... a duty to share in any losses
which may be sustained." Bassett 530 P.2d at 2. Evidence of these
characteristics of a partnership may be produced directly, or may be inferred from
the "actions taken by the parties." Rogers v. Bitner, 738 P.2d at 1032. The actions
of the parties in this case clearly indicate that the parties shared responsibilities
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and control over the dealership as well as a common purpose in managing the
business profitably for mutual benefit.
That Mr. Mardonlou had an interest in the business as a partner is
evidenced by the fact that he never had any business cards made for M & M
motors once he partnered with Mr. Ghaffarian, (R-1291 at p. 43:21-24), and by the
fact that he closed the M & M bank account and wrote checks from that point on
out of the Access Auto account. (R-1291 at p. 43:11-20).
The evidence introduced at trial also supports the finding that the Plaintiff
possessed and exercised authority over the business in several aspects. Firstly, the
property lease was executed by both parties together. (R-1290 at pp. 34:1435:11). Secondly, Mr. Ghaffarian ceased "doing business as" Access Auto as an
individual, but rather included Mr. Mardanlou's name as part of the entity doing
business as Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 40:10-41:6; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4).
Additionally, Mr. Mardanlou purchased vehicles on behalf of Access Auto (R1291 at pp. 76:22-77:15), and paid salaries for Access Auto's employees. (R-1290
at pp. 134:14-137:17; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 14).
As far as profits are concerned, two facts are key. Firstly, contrary to
Defendant's claim that the facts are undisputed that Mr. Ghaffarian never shared
the profits of Access Auto with Mr. Mardanlou, the evidence is clear that Mr.
Mardanlou received $10,000 as his share of profits in March of 1993. (R-1291 at
p. 48:7-20). It is also worth noting that Mr. Mardanlou was never paid
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commission as was the case for the regular salesmen who did not have a
partnership interest in the business. (R-1291 p. 257:15-20).
Clearly, the evidence supports the trial court's finding of a partnership, and
therefore, this Court should affirm that finding.
II
PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CLAIM IS NOT TIME-BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The four-year statute of limitations relied upon by Defendant should not be
applied to this case, and even if it were, Plaintiffs claim would still not be timebarred by the four-year limitations. Mr. Mardanlou's claim is governed by Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-6 as it concerns an interest in real property. This section of the
Utah Code states:
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an
action, founded upon the title to real property or to
rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual,
unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action
... was seized or possessed of the property in question
within seven years before the committing of the act in
respect to which such action is prosecuted or defense
or counterclaim made.

Plaintiffs action was brought pursuant to the lease agreement that created
in the Plaintiff a one-half interest in the property located at 3460-64 South State.
Because Plaintiffs claim is controlled by a seven-year statute of limitations and
was filed November of 1998, the action is timely brought if the cause of action
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accrued any time after November 1991, a time frame that neither side would
dispute.
The Defendant argues that the controlling statute of limitations is Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 which provides that an action "not founded upon an
instrument in writing" may be brought within four years. While Plaintiff disputes
the applicability of this statute to the case at bar, an analysis of the facts shows that
even if one were to apply the four-year statute of limitations, the cause of action
would not be barred by the statute of limitations because either: A) the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action occurred in November 1997; or B) the
statute of limitations was tolled because of defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct.
A.

The Ultimate Breach That Led to Dissolution of the
Partnership Took Place November 1997.

The trial court determined that the breach that led to the dissolution of the
partnership occurred on November 4th, 1997. (R-1292 at p. 519:12-15). The
statute of limitations began running on that date. The district court determined
that there was a partnership created in November 1991 and that the partnership
existed until November 4, 1997 (R-1290 atp. 66:5-7; R-1292 atp. 518:13-15; R1292 519:13-15). The complaint was filed on November 6, 1998. (R-l). Hassan,
for good reason, believed that he was a partner until 1997, when he left. (R-1290
at p. 66: 5-15). Thus, his cause of action arose on November 4, 1997 when he
discovered for the first time that Ali did not consider him a partner. See Allred v.
\
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Chynoweth, 990 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1993). This determination is a finding of fact,
supported by the record and should be accorded the appropriate deference. Spears
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 2 , 44 P.3d 742. Prior to this date, AH had continued to
make repeated statements to Hassan affirming and reaffirming the existence of the
partnership throughout the period that he and Hassan were working together as
Access Auto. (R-1288 at p.l65:18-24, R-1291 at p. 316:13-20). For example,
Hashem Fair believed that the partnership was still in effect while he was
employed at Access Auto in 1995. (R-1291 atp. 320:15-21).
Because there is ample evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the
Plaintiff reasonably believed that his cause of action did not ripen until that date,
this Court should hold that the statute of limitations is no bar to the Plaintiffs
claim.
B.

The Statute of Limitations is Tolled by Defendant's
Concealment or Misleading Conduct.

Even if the Court had determined that Hassan's cause of action arose
November 30, 1993, when Ali, by himself, executed the purchase of the option on
the land, the statute of limitations would be tolled by Ali's concealment and
misleading conduct in the execution of the purchase option and his continued
representation to Hassan that he was a partner in all things including the property.
(R-1290 at pp. 64:4 -65:8; R-1291 at p. 323:4-14). See Russell Packard
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, 78 P.3d 616 affd 2005 UT 14,
108P.3d741.
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In Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, the Utah Supreme Court clarifies the
"discovery rule" as it applies to a situation where the statute of limitations should
be "equitably tolled" because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct. In Russell Packard, the Court held that, "the rule requires an evaluation
of the reasonableness of a plaintiff s conduct in light of the defendant's fraudulent
or misleading conduct. Id. at f42. In order to properly evaluate the
reasonableness of a plaintiff s conduct when a defendant fraudulently causes a
plaintiff to delay in bringing a cause of action, the discovery rule balances (1) the
policy underlying all statutes of limitations to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared
with (2) the policy of not allowing a defendant who has concealed his wrongdoing
to profit from his concealment. Id. at ^J44 (citations omitted).
Thus, even if a claim is filed outside the statutory limits, the statute may be
tolled until the plaintiffs actual or constructive discovery. The question of when
this discovery occurs is a "highly fact-dependent legal question" that is
"necessarily a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact." Id. at 56; cf. Spears,
2002 UT 24 at H 32.
In this case, the trial court found that Mr. Ghaffarian committed fraud in his
representations to Mr. Mardanlou. (R-1292 at pp. 518:25-519:2). This and the
above-mentioned instances of misrepresentation clearly show that the Defendant
was actively hiding and misrepresenting the nature of the relationship between the
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parties. After evaluating all of the evidence, the trial court concluded that the
dissolution of the partnership occurred on November 4, 1997 and the statute of
limitations began then. The trial court specifically found that the Plaintiff had not
been "sleeping on his rights". (R-1293 at p. 131:22-24). Because this issue is one
best determined for the trier of fact, the decision of the lower court should be
affirmed.
While the Ghaffarians originally mentioned the Statute of Limitations as an
affirmative defense, initially claiming that UCA §§ 78-12-23, 78-12-25 and/or 7812-26 are controlling and act as a bar to Plaintiffs claim, the Ghaffarians never
introduced any argument or evidence to support this claim until it was thrown in at
the very end of the trial during closing arguments. (R-1291 at pp. 508:12 510:10). Under Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "the party
pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of
action is so barred."
Therefore whether UCA 78-12-6 or 78-12-25 apply, there is no valid statute
of limitations defense to Hassan's cause of action.

in
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE FAIR MARKET
RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY FROM NOVEMBER 4,1997 AND
THE STATUTORY INTEREST THEREON.
The trial court properly determined that the partnership created between
Hassan and Ali terminated on November 4, 1997 and properly awarded Hassan
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one-half interest in the partnership property upon termination. Since Hassan is a
one-half owner of 3460-64 South State Street, he is entitled to one-half of the fair
market rental value. At the time of trial there was only one piece of evidence that
applied to the fair market rental value. That evidence was the appraisal by Badi
Mahmood (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 8, pp. 97-105). His determination was that the
fair market value was $83,500 yearly rent. The court found as a matter of fact,
that the reasonable annual rental value for the property was $83,500 (R-1085). As
this finding was based upon credible evidence, this Court should leave the finding
undisturbed.
The district court based its award of a one-half interest plus one-half value
of rents on UCA § 48-1-39. This statute entitles the Plaintiff, Mr. Mardanlou to
receive "an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership"
This is reflected by the court's order that a one-half interest be conveyed to the
Plaintiff as of the date of the partnership's dissolution, November 4, 1997. (R1290 at p. 66:5-7; R-1292 at p. 519:13-15.) Statutorily, Plaintiff is also entitled to
either 1) interest on the value of the dissolved partnership or 2) "the profits
attributable to the use of [the partner's] right in the property of the dissolved
partnership." The Defendant argues that in this case, the Plaintiff is entitled to
neither of these considerations. Defendant argues that Mr. Mardanlou is not
entitled to profits because he failed to offer any evidence of profits. To support
this contention, Defendant looks to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Parker
v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, fn. 24 (Alaska 1988). However, that case
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is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Parker, a pre-trial order had been
issued that authorized one partner to possess the property, a cement mixing plant,
but did not order the partner to operate the plant. The partner in possession did not
operate the plant and was sued for the money that he could have conceivably
earned during the time in question. The rule in Parker, has been narrowly
construed by the Alaska Supreme Court, which distinguished Parker in Disotell v.
Stiltaer, No. S-10984 f70-74 (Alaska 2004), which held that where a partner
continues to possess partnership property for partnership purposes, the partner is
accountable to the partnership for any benefit he derived from his use of
partnership property.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded Plaintiff reasonable rental value
on the property in which he had an interest. The basis for this award was set forth
in great detail by the trial court in the Memorandum Decision of July 22, 2003. (R1093). Interest on said rental value was also properly awarded because the amount
of the rent is a liquidated amount, and the date due is set. Therefore, statutory
interest is proper in this case. See in general Holmgren Bros. Inc. v. Ballard, 534
P.2d (611) (Utah 1975); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
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IV
DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED AT MOST TO A SET OFF FOR THE
COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE AFTER NOVEMBER 4,1997
INSTEAD OF A SET OFF FOR ONE-HALF THE SUPPOSED VALUE OF
SAID IMPROVEMENTS.
The district court erred in its determination that Defendants were
entitled to a set off for the increased value of the property due to improvements
made after November 4, 1997 instead of a set off for one-half the actual cost of
said improvements. The district court relied on an occupation statute that can be
distinguished from the present case. Upon dissolution of the partnership, a tenancy
in common was established by the court by the court ordering Defendant to
convey a one half interest in the property to Plaintiff. (R-1221). Under Utah law,
cotenant without the consent of his fellow cotenants, he generally has no right of
contribution. Heiselt v. Heiselt 349 P.2d 175, 178-79 (Utah 1960). However, if
the court finds that Ali acted in good faith, with the bona fide belief that he was
the sole owner of the property, he may be entitled to a contribution for the "pro
rata share of expenses." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037
In this case, the Defendants should not be allowed to benefit from the value
increase of the property following Hassan's ownership of November 4, 1997 due
to property improvements. Rather, Hassan should have at most a set off of onehalf of the actual cost of said improvements, plus statutory interest on one-half of
the actual cost of said improvements. However, as the evidence indicates that
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Defendant did not act in good faith (R-129 at p 518:20-519:2). Additionally, the
Defendants/Appellants did not submit any hard costs of the improvements and
therefore are not entitled to any set off for the improvements.
CONCLUSION
The district court's finding that a partnership existed between Hassan
Mardanlou and Ali Ghaffarian should be affirmed because the Defendant failed to
properly marshal the facts in support of the finding, and the finding itself was
founded upon sufficient evidence. The judgment should further be affirmed
because the Defendant's claims regarding the statute of limitations are without
merit. Additionally, this Court should find that the trial court properly awarded
rental value damages to plaintiff with prejudgment interest.
As to the offset for improvements, the court should be reversed. The
Defendant is entitled to no offset for the costs of improvements because the
improvements were made without consent from the Plaintiff/cotenant. If
Defendant acted in good faith, he is entitled to the costs of repairs, not to their
value. As costs were never provided the district court, Defendant should be
awarded no offset at all.
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The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the district court be affirmed with
the exception of the value of the offsets awarded to Defendant.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd Day of June 2005.
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